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ADVANCEMENT OF LEGAL FEES MAY BE MORE THAN
CORPORATIONS BARGAINED FOR:
MILLER V. MILLER, 973 N.E.2D 228 (OHIO 2012)
Caitlin Graham

I. INTRODUCTION
Smart, driven, and financially savvy directors are the touchstones of
well-run corporations. Therefore, it is no surprise that seeking and
attracting qualified individuals to serve in those roles is a priority for
corporations. However, serving as a director comes with many
responsibilities and risks. An environment that makes it safe for
directors to take risks encourages risk taking. A business environment
that encourages risk taking—prudent risk taking but still risk taking—is
an environment that is good for business. The “business judgment rule”
protects officers and directors, acting in their official capacity, from
liability for exercising the judgment demanded by their roles.1 The
expansion of the business judgment rule and the statutory protections
limiting directors’ personal liability for actions taken as director have
created a framework that encourages qualified candidates to seek these
positions, giving corporations the best opportunity to be competitive.
To promote that capitalistic culture, a key consideration for any
potential director is the right to advancement.
Advancement prevents directors from having to pay out of pocket for
legal fees incurred defending actions related to their position as
director.2 The right of advancement creates an obligation for the
corporation to pay the legal fees of directors as they are incurred.
Advancement is triggered when a claim related to the conduct of a
director in carrying out his duties as director is filed.3 Therefore, it
allows for front-end payment. A closely related right, but distinct from
advancement, is indemnification, which occurs at the close of litigation
and refers to the right of the director to be reimbursed for legal fees.4 If
1. MELVIN ARON EISENBERG & JAMES D. COX, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS 770-771 (10th ed. 2011) (“[The business judgment rule] ‘is a presumption that in
making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith, and
in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interest of the company.’ Nevertheless, a
showing that the board breached either its fiduciary duty of care of its fiduciary duty of loyalty in
connection with a challenged transaction may rebut this presumption.”) (footnote omitted) (citing
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)).
2. Richard A. Rossman, et al., Symposium, Primer on Advancement of Defense Costs: The
Rights and Duties of Officers and Corporations, 85 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 29, 31 (2007).
3. Id. This was an issue raised by the plaintiff in Miller and the Court failed to adequately
address whether or not advancement applies only in these situations.
4. Id.
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the director succeeds in his defense, the corporation will reimburse the
fees. Otherwise, the director is responsible for the fees.5
In 1986, the Ohio General Assembly amended its corporate statutes,
marking a change in many corporate laws, including the addition of
default advancement for directors. The Ohio Supreme Court recently
examined the advancement statute for the first time in Miller v. Miller.6
This Article analyzes the business climate when the amendments were
adopted, the court’s decision in Miller, and the potential issues this
statute creates going forward, especially for close corporations. Part II
takes a retrospective look at the climate of corporate litigation when the
1986 amendments were enacted, the provisions of the advancement
amendments in Ohio and Delaware, and the Ohio Supreme Court’s
decision in Miller. Part III examines Ohio’s adoption of opt-out
advancement, the Miller decision, and the effects of both on the future of
advancement rights in Ohio. Part IV concludes that Miller, rather than
clarifying the issue of advancement, only succeeded in creating more
questions for Ohio companies and the attorneys advising them.
II. BACKGROUND
A. 1980s: A Growing Concern Regarding Personal Liability of
Corporate Officers and Directors.
When Ohio amended its corporate statutes in 1986, immense
uncertainty and anxiety existed in the corporate world. Recent court
decisions and increasing directors’ and officers’ (D&O) insurance
premiums created an environment that caused legislatures to prepare for
the worst.7
In Smith v. Van Gorkom, the Delaware Supreme Court held that
directors were not protected by the business judgment rule in situations
in which they failed to “inform themselves of all information reasonably
available to them and relevant to their decision” and failed to “disclose
all material information” to shareholders.8 The transaction in Van
Gorkom was a merger in which the CEO and the board of directors
acted quickly to sell the company at a share price that was above market
value but had not been independently confirmed as the intrinsic value of
the stock.9 Rather than review any reports, the board relied on the oral
5. Id.
6. Miller v. Miller, 973 N.E.2d 228, 233 (Ohio 2012).
7. See Deborah Cahalane, 1986 Ohio Corporation Amendments: Expanding the Scope of
Director Immunity, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 663, 664 (1987).
8. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 893 (Del. 1985).
9. Id. at 865–67.
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presentations of the CEO and the company’s attorney.10 Although the
board voted for a bid period to test the value of the stock, it did not
review the merger contract before approving it.11 The court held that the
board of directors acted with gross negligence for conduct that seemed
to be mere negligence,12 thus limiting the believed broad protection of
the business judgment rule.
One year earlier, in Jones v. VIP Development Co., the Ohio Supreme
Court had lowered the threshold for traditional negligence.13 Van
Gorkom and Jones demonstrated the courts’ widespread willingness to
hold negligent parties to a higher standard of care and resulted in great
uncertainty for corporate directors.
To make matters worse, at that time claims against corporate directors
and officers had almost tripled nationally.14 In 1985, one in five
directors was involved in litigation.15 Due to the growing number of
claims and uncertainty about the protection of the business judgment
rule, D&O premiums skyrocketed, increasing tenfold between 1984 and
1986.16 At the same time, insurers refused to underwrite claims in
excess of $10 million, despite a median policy limit of $25 million.17
Corporations’ inability to insure directors and the expanded potential
liability for directors resulted in an exodus of independent directors from
corporations and a shrinking field of directors willing to undertake the
risks associated with the position.
For good reason, corporations were nervous. Indiana’s legislature
was the first to react, followed by Delaware, and then forty other
states.18 The new amendments were designed to reduce the risk of
directors’ personal liability for money damages in hopes of attracting
qualified individuals to the position.19
Several states expanded
nonexclusivity provisions, allowing for
more than just
indemnification.20 Many of these expansions seemed to allow for
10. Id. at 869.
11. Id. at 869.
12. Cahalane, supra note 7, at 669–70.
13. Jones v. VIP Dev. Co., 472 N.E.2d 1046, 1059 (Ohio 1984).
14. Cahalane, supra note 7, at 670–71.
15. Id. at 671 n.44.
16. Id. at 671.
17. Id. at 671 n.46.
18. James J. Hanks, Jr., Evaluating Recent Changes in State Legislation on Director and Officer
Liability Limitation and Indemnification, 43 BUS. LAW. 1207, 1209 (1988).
19. Id. at 1209.
20. Id. at 1226–27 (“Nonexclusivity provisions offer an important opportunity for corporate
counsel to craft broad protection for directors and officers. . . . These contracts should be drafted as
‘freestanding’ obligations containing all of the substantive rights (including advancement of expenses)
and necessary procedures to furnish the desired protection without relying upon changeable statutes or
charter or by-law provisions.”).
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advancement in cases of willful misconduct or even recklessness,
neither of which had been allowed previously.21
B. Ohio’s Response
In 1986, Ohio joined the movement to quell the worry and uncertainty
and amended its corporate statutes.22 Ohio broadened its alreadycodified business judgment rule and expanded the instances in which a
director could be indemnified for legal fees.23 But most notably, Ohio
added the right to advancement for corporate directors.24 Combined,
these expansions greatly decreased the circumstances in which a director
would be personally responsible for the costs of litigation.25
The Ohio State Bar Association (OSBA) was a key player in the
quick adoption of the 1986 amendments.26 According to the OSBA, the
amendment was necessary because corporations were leaving Ohio,
citing more favorable statutes in other states as the reason.27 The
General Assembly, in an “emergency,” adopted the expansion of
director rights.28
Currently, the advancement of legal fees to directors is the default
rule for Ohio corporations; the corporation must specifically opt out in
its articles of incorporations or bylaws by citing the statute.29 The
advancement statute provides that the duty to advance fees in a specific
case arises when the director agrees to repay the fees if the director
21. Id. at 1226.
22. Cahalane, supra note 7, at 672.
23. Id. at 665; see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(a) (West 2012).
24. Cahalane, supra note 7, at 672.
25. Id.
26. Merit Brief of Amicus Curiae the Ohio State Bar Association in Support of Appellant Sam
M. Miller at 1, Miller v. Miller, 973 N.E.2d 228 (Ohio 2012) (No. 2011-0024) [hereinafter OSBA Brief].
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.13(E)(5)(a) (West 2012).
Unless at the time of a director’s act or omission that is the subject of an action, suit, or
proceeding referred to in division (E)(1) or (2) of this section, the articles or the regulations of a
corporation state, by specific reference to this division, that the provisions of this division do not
apply to the corporation and unless the only liability asserted against a director in an action, suit,
or proceeding referred to in division (E)(1) or (2) of this section is pursuant to section 1701.95 of
the Revised Code, expenses, including attorney’s fees, incurred by a director in defending the
action, suit, or proceeding shall be paid by the corporation as they are incurred, in advance of the
final disposition of the action, suit, or proceeding, upon receipt of an undertaking by or on behalf
of the director in which the director agrees to do both of the following:
(i) Repay that amount if it is proved by clear and convincing evidence in a court of
competent jurisdiction that the director’s action or failure to act involved an act or
omission undertaken with deliberate intent to cause injury to the corporation or
undertaken with reckless disregard for the best interests of the corporation;
(ii) Reasonably cooperate with the corporation concerning the action, suit, or proceeding.
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loses, and the director agrees to reasonably cooperate with the
corporation in the pending suit.30
Unlike Ohio, the majority of states and the Model Business
Corporation Act (The Model Act) have a permissive advancement
statute that allows corporations to grant advancement but does not
automatically create an obligation to advance fees.31 In permissive
jurisdictions, a corporation will typically adopt language similar to the
statute in its articles of incorporation or bylaws granting the right to and
scope of advancement.32 In all jurisdictions, including Ohio, precision
and specificity in drafting corporate governing documents is dispositive
of the rights and obligations of directors.33
C. Delaware Advancement
Delaware, like Ohio, reacted to the panic by enacting statutes that
provide expanded protection of directors under the business judgment
rule and limit the instances in which directors are personally responsible
for legal fees. However, the Delaware advancement law is permissive,
whereas the Ohio law is the default. A Delaware corporation may
include advancement in its articles of incorporation or its bylaws, but in
the absence of an advancement clause, a director cannot force the
corporation to advance legal fees.34
The Delaware Supreme Court has addressed the issue of advancement
several times, mostly notably in Homestore, Inc. v. Tafeen.35 Homestore
had adopted advancement rights for its officers but then refused to pay
fees for civil and criminal proceedings for its director, Tafeen.36 The
court held that when a company has adopted mandatory advancement,
the company cannot avoid advancement, even under the most egregious
circumstances.37
Once a Delaware corporation adopts the right to advancement, the
court will enforce the director’s rights.38 Although challenges to
advancement are allowed in summary proceedings, the advancement
right granted in a corporation’s articles of incorporation or bylaws is

30. Id.
31. Rossman, et al., supra note 2, at 34.
32. Id. at 34.
33. Id. at 36.
34. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (West 2011).
35. Homestore, Inc. v. Tafeen, 886 A.2d 502 (Del. 2005).
36. Id. at 503.
37. Id. at 505.
38. Stephen A. Radin, “Sinners Who Find Religion”: Advancement of Litigation Expenses to
Corporate Officials Accused of Wrongdoing, 25 REV. LITIG. 251, 256–57 (2006).

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2014

5

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 8

312

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 82

treated as a contractual provision.39 The purpose of advancement, the
Delaware Supreme Court has stated, is to “promote the desirable end
that corporate officials will resist what they consider unjustified suits
and claims, secure in the knowledge that their reasonable expenses will
be borne by the corporation they have served if they are vindicated.”40
That purpose prevails across the country and summarizes why the right
to advancement is important to a corporation’s ability to recruit quality
directors.
D. Miller v. Miller
The Ohio Supreme Court addressed the 1986 advancement statute for
the first time in Miller v. Miller.41 Relying on Delaware law, the Court
held that the defendant, Sam M. Miller (Director Miller), was entitled to
advancement of legal fees for his defense in a derivative suit brought by
shareholders of Trumbell Industries (Shareholders-Miller), a close
corporation.42
Trumbell Industries (Trumbell), an Ohio close
corporation that sold plumbing supplies, was owned by four cousins,
each of whom also served as a director of Trumbell.43
1. The Parties: A Civil War
The plaintiffs were one set of Miller cousins (Shareholders-Miller)
who together owned 50% of Trumbell stock and made up two of the
four members of the Board of Directors.44 A majority of the Board did
not approve the suit because the four family members had been divided,
two to two, for years.45 Trumbell was later added as a plaintiff without
the Board’s approval.46
The defendant, Director Miller, was another cousin who owned 25%
of Trumbell.47 His brother was the final 25% owner. Director Miller
and his brother were the other two members of the Board of Directors.48
Shareholders-Millers brought a derivative action against the
39. Id. at 256–57.
40. Homestore, 886 A.2d at 505.
41. Miller v. Miller, 973 N.E.2d 228 (Ohio 2012).
42. Id. at 230.
43. Id.
44. Merit Brief of Appellees at 3, Miller v. Miller, 973 N.E.2d 228 (Ohio 2012) (No. 2011-0024)
[hereinafter Shareholders Brief].
45. Merit Brief of Appellant Sam M. Miller at *26–27, Miller v. Miller, 973 N.E.2d 228 (Ohio
2012) (No. 11-0024), 2011 WL 2249529 [hereinafter Miller Brief].
46. Id.
47. Shareholders Brief, supra note 44, at 4.
48. Id.
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defendant alleging Director Miller’s involvement with a third-party
company that also sold plumbing supplies was a violation of his
fiduciary duty.49 In addition to being a shareholder, Director Miller was
Vice President of Sales and Marketing, Plumbing-Products Manager,
and a member of the Trumbell Board of Directors.50
2. The Eleventh District Court of Appeals Ruling: A Valiant Effort
The claim alleged that Director Miller entered into an agreement with
another company in violation of his fiduciary duties to Trumbell.51
After the suit commenced, Director Miller reimbursed himself for his
current legal fees and submitted an “undertaking” to Trumbell, calling
on his right to advancement pursuant to ORC 1701.13(E)(5).52
Following the provision’s requirements, Director Miller’s undertaking
stated that he agreed to repay the fees should he not be successful in his
defense and to reasonably cooperate with the corporation during the
suit.53 Both sides moved for declaratory judgment on the issue of
advancement.54 The trial court ordered Trumbell to advance the legal
fees to Director Miller because, according to the undertaking, he had
complied with the requirements in the Ohio statute.55
The Eleventh District Court of Appeals reversed, holding that
Director Miller was not entitled to advancement because the relevant
provisions of the code are limited to a lawsuit where the director is
seeking to secure a benefit for the corporation.56 The Eleventh District
focused on two aspects of the statute: (1) “an act or omission” and (2)
“an action, suit, or proceeding referred to in division (E)(1) or (E)(2).”57
The court found that this case did not meet either requirement. First, the
allegations centered on Director Miller’s involvement with an outside
company, which meant that Director Miller was not acting within the
scope of his directorial duties, and therefore, the claim did not concern
an act or omission on behalf of the corporation.58 Second, the court
found that the case fell within the exclusionary language contained in
the statute because (E)(1) and (E)(2) are only applicable if the director
49. Miller v. Miller, 973 N.E.2d 228, 230 (Ohio 2012).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Ohio law requires directors submit an undertaking, which is a written statement in which the
director agrees to abide by O.R.C. § 1701.13(E)(5)(a).
53. Miller, 973 N.E.2d at 230.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Miller v. Miller, 942 N.E.2d. 438, 445 (Ohio Ct. App. 11th Dist. 2010).
57. Id.
58. Id.
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“acted in good faith and in a manner he reasonably believed to be in or
not opposed to the best interests of the corporation.”59 According to the
court, Director Miller was not acting in the best interest of the
corporation when he entered into the agreement with the other company.
Section (E)(2) further excluded this action because that section relates to
a director seeking to procure a judgment in favor of the corporation.60
The court also explained that division (E)(1) only applies to cases “other
than an action by or in the right of the corporation.”61 The court held
that “any other interpretation has the potential to result in significant
injustice to the corporation and any of the remaining shareholders.”62
In a concurrence, Judge Grendall emphasized the finding that section
1701.13(E)(5)(a) only allows for advancement in actions where the
director acted in good faith and not in opposition to the best interests of
the corporation.63 Furthermore, Judge Grendall stated that the defendant
could not meet the requirement of reasonable cooperation because the
defendant’s interests were opposed to the corporation’s.64 Director
Miller appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court.65
3. The Ohio Supreme Court: A Simplified Version of the Case
The Ohio Supreme Court’s decision first distinguished between the
right to advancement and the right to indemnification.66 It found that
advancement is a separate and distinct right while the underlying action
is pending and is essential to the defendant’s ability to mount a
defense.67
Therefore, advancement is not dependent on
indemnification.68 Nor is advancement limited when the corporation
alleges conduct that, if proven, would bar indemnification.69 The court
found that allowing a corporation to avoid advancement by alleging
misconduct would render the advancement law moot.70 In this way,
Shareholders-Miller’s allegation that Director Miller violated his
fiduciary duty did not absolve Trumbell from the obligation to advance

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 446 (Grendall, J., concurring).
Id. at 447.
Miller v. Miller, 973 N.E.2d 228, 233 (Ohio 2012).
Id. at 234.
Id.
Id. at 237.
Id.
Id. at 238.
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Director Miller’s legal fees.71
The corporation argued that advancement is only available in an
“action, suit, or proceeding” referred to in (E)(1) or (2), namely where
“the person acted in good faith, and in a manner the person reasonably
believed to be in or not opposed to the best interests of the
corporation.”72 The majority dismissed this argument because, as stated
above, advancement is not dependent on whether the director would be
entitled to indemnification.73 The court relied heavily on United States
v. Stein,74 a Southern District of New York case applying Delaware law,
despite the fact that the Ohio and Delaware statutes are fundamentally
different.75 In Stein, the main issues were whether the court had
jurisdiction over the advancement claim and what law applied.76 The
decision, although it contained a short discussion of the advancement
rights in Delaware,77 provided a civil procedure analysis of
advancement, rather than a substantive one.78 Furthermore, the case
involved several contractual obligations regarding advancement between
the corporation and the defendants, which were absent in Miller.79
Although the court of appeals found the plaintiff’s argument
persuasive, the Ohio Supreme Court stated that the court of appeals
wrongly decided the issue of advancement because it focused on
indemnification, but the Ohio Supreme Court did not address the
significance or role of the language in section 1701.13(E)(5) referring to
(E)(1) and (2) that the court of appeals had found so interesting.
The court then addressed circumstances when a corporation does not
have a duty to advance fees. According to ORC 1701.13(E)(5)(a), a
company opting out of advancement must specifically state that the law
regarding advancement does not apply to it.80 Under the statute, the
court held that advancement is mandatory unless the company
specifically opts out.81 The Court found that Trumbell did not
specifically opt out of the provision.82
Trumbell’s articles of
incorporation did allow for indemnification but made no reference to
71. Id. at 238–39.
72. Id. at 237.
73. Id.
74. United States v. Stein, 452 F.Supp.2d 230 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), vacated sub nom. Stein v.
KPMG, LLP, 486 F.3d 753 (2d Cir. 2007).
75. Miller v. Miller, 973 N.E.2d 228, 237 (Ohio 2012).
76. Stein, 452 F.Supp.2d at 269–71.
77. Id. at 271–72.
78. Id. at 273 (conducting an Erie Doctrine analysis of advancement law).
79. Id. at 239.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 240.
82. Id. at 239.
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advancement.83 Because advancement is the default in Ohio, Trumbell
had to affirmatively opt out in order to avoid it.84
However, the court also found that, under the statute, advancement,
although mandatory, is not automatic.85
A defendant seeking
advancement must execute an undertaking, agreeing to repay the fees if
his defense is unsuccessful and reasonably cooperate with the
corporation concerning the action, suit, or proceeding.86 The court
found that Director Miller fulfilled the requirements that triggered the
advancement.87 Once Trumbell received Director Miller’s undertaking,
its duty to advance legal fees became mandatory.88
The court dismissed Shareholders-Miller’s argument that Director
Miller was acting as an officer in his capacity as Vice President and
therefore, was not entitled to advancement.89 The court stated that
because the plaintiff had not raised the issue in the lower court, it could
not do so now.90
The majority also dismissed Shareholders-Miller’s argument that
Director Miller did not reasonably cooperate and found that
Shareholders-Miller’s evidence purporting to show Director Miller’s
lack of cooperation was inadequate.91 Shareholders-Miller’s evidence
included the trial court’s finding that Director Miller had wrongfully
withheld documents and had been ordered to reimburse the plaintiff’s
legal fees for expenses incurred as a result of his delay.92 Director
Miller produced the documents, including a letter that became the crux
of the plaintiff’s case, only after the corporation filed a request for
sanctions.93 Shareholders-Miller also presented deposition testimony in
which, in response to a question regarding Director Miller’s cooperation
with the plaintiffs, Director Miller stated he would only respond to
requests from a majority of the Board.94 Because the Trumbell Board
had been deadlocked in a family feud for over a decade and split the
parties in the suit, getting a majority of the Board to agree on anything
was an impossible task.95 The court found that Shareholders-Miller did
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id.
Id. at 240.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 240–41.
Id. at 241.
Id. at 238.
Id.
Id.
Shareholder’s Brief, supra note 44, at 15.
Id.
Id. at 18; see also Miller v. Miller, 973 N.E.2d 228, 240 (Ohio 2012).
A majority decision was impossible because the Board was divided in the suit. Shareholders
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not point to anything specific showing Director Miller actually failed to
cooperate, and furthermore, the court found that the duty to reasonably
cooperate should not require the director to surrender his right to defend
himself.96 The court again cited Stein in support of its argument that
companies still have a duty to advance legal fees when they sue
directors for wrongdoing.97 In rejecting the plaintiff’s argument, the
court stated the evidence was inadequate to show the defendant was
uncooperative, suggesting that evidence of an uncooperative director
may be the way out of advancement.98
The court held that Director Miller was entitled to advancement of his
legal fees, despite being sued by directors/shareholders of the close
corporation for breach of his fiduciary duties.99
4. The Dissent: A Plea to the General Assembly
Justice O’Donnell, in a short dissent, found that mandatory
advancement does not apply to companies suing their own directors for
breach of directors’ duties because such a director would have acted in
his individual capacity and could not reasonably cooperate with the
company.100 Therefore, the requirements for advancement cannot be
met in those situations.101
Advancement is only required, Justice O’Donnell argued, in claims
arising out of service as a director.102 Therefore, Trumbell had no
statutory duty to advance expenses if the director acted in an individual
capacity, as he found Director Miller did.103
The dissent argued that it was not the General Assembly’s intent to
force a company to advance legal fees for a defense against itself.104
This argument was evident by the wording of the statute requiring the
director to “reasonably cooperate” with the corporation.105 As Justice
O’Donnell explained, “when the director and the corporation are adverse
parties in litigation, the director simply cannot reasonably cooperate in
Brief, supra note 44, at 18.
96. Miller, 973 N.E.2d at 240–41.
97. Id. at 241 (“[T]he duty to advance expenses often requires companies to advance the cost of
defending claims that allege wrongs to the companies, even lawsuits brought by companies themselves
against former officers and directors.”) (quoting United States v. Stein, 452 F. Supp. 2d 230, 272
(S.D.N.Y. 2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
98. Id. at 240–41.
99. Id. at 241.
100. Id. at 241–42 (O’Donnell, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 242.
102. Id. at 241.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 242.
105. Id.
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the manner required by the statute, and the circumstances of this case
demonstrate the futility of expecting a director to fully and honestly
assist the corporation’s suit against him.”106 The dissent pointed out that
the majority failed to recognize the director’s duty to reasonably
cooperate with the corporation.107 In this case, because Director Miller
was being sued by the corporation, Director Miller could not reasonably
cooperate and should not be expected to, even if he says he will.108 The
dissent went on to say that the company should not have to wait until
final adjudication of the underlying action before receiving a judgment
on advancement.109 Here, the allegations had enough substance to
suggest that Director Miller was acting ultra vires, and therefore, would
not be entitled to indemnification protection after the case and therefore
not entitled to advancement during the case.110
Justice O’Donnell ended his dissent by encouraging the General
Assembly to clarify the law in this area to exclude advancement when a
corporation sues its own directors.111
III. ANALYSIS
The Miller case presented a complex situation in which to apply the
advancement statute. The complexity of the issues and the uniqueness
of the parties made it a challenging case to create a valuable
interpretation of the law for the future. Consequently, Miller created an
inappropriately simplistic precedent that created more uncertainty than
existed before the case was decided. That inappropriate simplicity is
most poignant in the application of the statute to a closely held, family
company.
A. Unique Circumstances Lead to Unintended Consequences
The 1986 Comment to the corporate amendments stated that a
corporation, unless its articles of incorporation specifically state that
section 1701.13(E)(5)(a) does not apply to it, is required to advance
legal fees to a director when it receives an undertaking by the director
(1) to repay the fees if his conduct is deemed to have been recoverable
under section 1701.59, and (2) to cooperate with the corporation.112 The
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id.
Id. at 243.
Id. at 242–43.
Id. at 243.
Id.
Id.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.13 (West 2012).
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1986 amendment greatly increased the allowable scope of directors’
actions and greatly decreased the financial risk for directors.113
The Ohio General Assembly has a history of adopting default, rather
than permissive, corporate laws.114 Such laws are contrary to the Model
Act and many Delaware statutes. One may argue that the laws make
Ohio more “business friendly,” which is precisely what the OSBA
argued when its Corporation Law Committee proposed the emergency
adoption of default advancement.115 As stated above, Ohio wanted to
stop directors and corporations from fleeing the state.116 In its amicus
brief, the OSBA stated that the amendment was quickly adopted with
overwhelming support.117 That many politicians are not familiar with
the complexities of corporate law or that the OSBA had an interest
(certainly a justified one though) in paid attorney’s fees are undisputed.
Therefore, it is not surprising that an emergency adoption of the default
1986 amendment has had unintended consequences. The fact that the
OSBA was the main contributor and that the amendment was passed in a
frantic attempt to prevent a migration of corporations away from the
state, begs the question whether the language adopted really does further
the best interest of corporations, specifically close corporations like
Trumbell.118
The problem in 1986 was the inability of corporations to attract
quality directors because of the threat of liability.119 As previously
stated, good directors are often behind good corporations. In the interest
of promoting corporate welfare in this manner, Ohio created a default
advancement regime.120 The concern at the time was attracting
directors, not the actual effect of paying directors’ legal fees.121
The consequence is the court’s ruling that advancement is mandatory
unless a corporation opts out. The implications of the default rule are
apparent in Miller, which illustrates how a blanket default advancement
rule causes problems for close corporations.122 Without proper limits,
forcing this type of advancement regime on all corporations is contrary
113. Cahalane, supra note 7, at 672.
114. Examples of default provisions include the quorum default, OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1701.51(A), the cumulative-voting default, § 1701.55, the length-of-term default, § 1701.57, and the
liability-shield default, § 1701.59(D).
115. OSBA Brief, supra note 26, at 2.
116. Id. at 1.
117. Id.
118. “Close corporations have only a small number of shareholders, and are typically
characterized by owner-management. . . . [M]odern courts have come to understand that close
corporations often need special treatment.” EISENBERG & COX, supra note 1, at 452.
119. OSBA Brief, supra note 26, at 26.
120. Id. at 2.
121. Id.
122. Shareholders Brief, supra note 44, at 3.
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to the purpose of the 1986 amendments.
B. The Need for Legislative Clarification
The Ohio Supreme Court correctly construed ORC 1701.13(E)(5)(a)
but incorrectly distilled the case down to a corporation suing its director
for violation of a fiduciary duty.123 This distillation oversimplified the
facts of the claim and therefore, prevented the court from thoroughly
analyzing the statute.
According to the statute, advancement is a guaranteed right for
directors in all but two circumstances: when the corporation disclaims
its applicability in its articles of incorporation or bylaws or when the
director fails to meet the requirements of the statute.124 The Ohio
Supreme Court’s holding was warranted in three ways. Fundamentally,
indemnification and advancement are two distinct rights, not dependent
on each other, and advancement was the only issue in the case.125
Statutorily, Ohio law makes advancement the default rule, and therefore,
the corporation is responsible for understanding its advancement
duties.126 Specifically, because the Supreme Court found Director
Miller met the requirements of the statute, it had to find in his favor.127
First, the Court rejected any argument that advancement is dependent
on indemnification because under longstanding corporate law, the two
rights are distinct, and under Ohio law, the legislature treated them
separately.128
The Ohio Revised Code (ORC) provides that
indemnification “may” be allowed, but the ORC provides that
advancement “shall” be awarded as long as the statutory requirements
are met.129 The court was correct in holding that fundamentally the two
rights are distinct and advancement is not dependent on the ultimate
ability to be indemnified.130
The court was also correct in pointing out that regardless of the
indemnification rights provided in the articles of incorporation,
Trumbell failed to disclaim its duty to advance fees in the same articles
or regulations.131 The Ohio statute shifts the burden to the corporation
123. Miller v. Miller, 973 N.E.2d 228, 230 (Ohio 2012).
124. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.13(E)(5)(a) (West 2012).
125. Miller, 973 N.E.2d at 429–30.
126. Id. at 240.
127. Id. at 241.
128. Id. at 233–34.
129. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.13(E)(1) (“A corporation may indemnify . . . .”) (emphasis
added); § 1701.13(E)(5)(a) (“[E]xpenses . . . shall be paid by the corporation as they are incurred . . . .”)
(emphasis added).
130. Miller, 973 N.E.2d at 234.
131. Id. at 240.
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to understand what duties it undertakes when it incorporates in Ohio.
The law specifically allows a corporation to opt out completely from the
requirement.132 Advancement, by its definition, implies an unsavory
position in which the director of a company is being sued for her actions
or omissions as a director. That is precisely why the advancement right
is important to attract directors. The court’s holding shows that a
corporation cannot use a statutory provision to attract a director, then
turn around and disclaim that duty in order to avoid paying for that same
director’s fees if and when the case arises. If Trumbell had wanted to
avoid advancement, it could have done so at any time by amending the
articles or bylaws.133 Trumbell did not, and therefore, it cannot try to
avoid its statutory obligations when an unpleasant case emerges.134
Finally, because the court found that Director Miller met the statutory
requirements, it correctly held his legal fees had to be advanced. The
court, after analyzing the “reasonable cooperation” requirement, found
that Director Miller did comply. Therefore, the moment Trumbell
received the undertaking its duty was triggered.135
On its face, the opinion applied a straightforward and correct statutory
interpretation based on the plain language of the rule. However, the
case presented more complex issues that remain unsettled by the
opinion.
1. Are There Any Limits in Section 1701.13(E)(5)?
The court failed to address whether advancement applies to a
company’s suit against its own director in two regards: first, by omitting
the provision of the statute that referred to ORC 1701.13(E)(1) or (2);
and second, by not adequately vetting the circumstances under which
Director Miller was sued.
First, the court rendered the (E)(1) and (E)(2) language in section
1701.13 superfluous and wrongly relied on a Delaware decision in
making this determination. ORC 1701.13 provides:
(5)(a) Unless at the time of a director’s act or omission that is the subject
of an action, suit, or proceeding referred to in division (E)(1) or (2) of
this section, the articles . . . state, . . . that the provisions of this division
do not apply to the corporation and unless the only liability asserted
against a director in an action, suit, or proceeding referred to in division
(E)(1) or (2) of this section is pursuant to section 1701.95 of the Revised
Code, expenses, including attorney’s fees, incurred by a director in
132.
133.
134.
135.

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.13(E)(5)(a) (West 2012).
Miller, 973 N.E.2d at 239.
Id. at 240.
Id. at 241.
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defending the action, suit, or proceeding shall be paid by the
corporation . . . 136

The court did not address the “action, suit, or proceeding referred to
in division (E)(1) or (2)” that is referenced twice in the provision.
Sections (E)(1) and (2) govern indemnification rights.137 The court of
appeals addressed this issue extensively. In doing so, it came to the
conclusion that cases under (E)(1) and (2) are cases in which the director
is seeking to secure a benefit for the corporation.138 The concurring
appellate opinion found that the cases referred to in those provisions are
those in which the “the person acted in good faith and in a manner the
person reasonably believed to be in or not opposed to the best interests
of the corporation,” in other words, when the director is protected by the
business judgment rule.139 The Ohio Supreme Court rejected those
arguments, finding the court of appeals wrongly made advancement
reliant on indemnification.140
The Ohio Supreme Court then relied on Stein which stated
a company that undertakes to advance defense costs may not avoid that
obligation by claiming that the litigation against its former employee for
which the employee seeks advancement of defense costs accuses the
employee of conduct that, if proven, would foreclose indemnification or
establish a breach . . . of duty.141

The Stein court was not analyzing the right to advancement but rather
was looking at advancement in an Erie Doctrine analysis.142
Furthermore, the Miller Court failed to recognize distinctions in the
Ohio and Delaware statutes.
The Delaware code states that
“expenses . . . may be paid by the corporation,” as provided for in the
corporation’s articles or bylaws.143 Unlike the Ohio provisions, the
Delaware statute contains no reference to the types of actions or
proceedings for which advance fees are allowed. In fact, the Delaware
statute only states that fees may be paid in advance when a corporation
receives an undertaking stating that the director or officer will repay the
amount if it is determined he is not entitled to indemnification.144
Therefore, when the Stein Court held that alleging misconduct does not
eliminate the obligation of advancement, it was interpreting a different
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.13(E)(5)(a) (West 2012) (emphasis added).
Id. § 1701.13(E)(1)–(2).
Miller v. Miller, 942 N.E.2d 438, 445 (Ohio Ct. App. 11th Dist. 2010).
Id. at 446 (Grendell, J., concurring).
Miller, 973 N.E.2d at 237.
Id. (emphasis added).
United States v. Stein, 452 F. Supp. 2d 230, 271–73 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(e) (West 2011) (emphasis added).
Id.
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statute as well as the rights provided in the specific company’s articles
of incorporation and contracts with the defendants in that case.145 The
Ohio Supreme Court, therefore, was incorrect in relying on Stein to do a
substantive analysis on whether the defendant in Miller had a statutory
right to advancement under Ohio law. This holding renders the
additional language in the code superfluous, violating one of the key
canons of statutory interpretation, namely that the legislature means
what it says and does not use superfluous words.146
Based on the language of the statute, the court should have limited
advancement to cases in (E)(1) or (2).147 It should have also specified to
what cases (E)(1) and (2) referred. Although the court points out that
relying on indemnification for advancement is inconsistent with the
general understanding that does not allow the court to disregard the
language in favor of a reading that is based on distinct law, the court did
not declare the language in the statute inconsistent. Instead, it ignored
explicit statutory language.
The Shareholders-Miller argued that (E)(5) was limited to actions
challenging a director’s conduct as a director.148 According to
Shareholders-Miller, (E)(1) and (2) should be read in conjunction with
the undertaking requirement of (E)(5)(a)(i)–(ii).149 The standard in the
undertaking is the same as the standard for the business judgment rule
protection in section 1701.59.150 Therefore, the statute should not
require advancement in cases in which “the director’s action or failure to
act involved an act or omission undertaken with deliberate intent to
cause injury to the corporation or undertaken with reckless disregard for
the best interests of the corporation.”151
The defendant argued that (E)(5) was meant to cover any lawsuit filed
against a director that is “based on his or her position as director,
regardless of whether that lawsuit was filed by the corporation itself, by
shareholders of the corporation, or by a person or company outside of
the corporation.”152 Sections (E)(1) and (2) refer to actions brought by a
person or party outside of the corporation and those brought “by or in
the right of the corporation,” respectively.153 This suggests that the
statute anticipated directors being sued by their corporations and being
145. Id.; see also Stein, 452 F. Supp. 2d at 239.
146. See, e.g., Doe v. Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 962 A.2d 342, 351 (Md. 2008). The
Court in Miller also cites statutory canons, but then ignores them. Miller, 973 N.E.2d at 240.
147. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.13(E)(5) (West 2012).
148. Shareholders Brief, supra note 44, at 29–30.
149. Id. at 30.
150. Id. at 31.
151. Id. (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(D) (West 2012)).
152. Miller Brief, supra note 45, at 11.
153. Id.
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advanced legal fees.154
The statutory language is ambiguous. The statute specifically
references (E)(1) and (2) twice, but the court merely states that
advancement is not reliant on indemnification without providing an
explanation for that clause.
The reference to the indemnification provision does place a limit on
the mandatory advancement.155 The court did not see any limits in the
Ohio statute because advancement, according to Delaware law, would
not have any limits.156 In this instance, comparison with the scope of
Delaware law was misplaced because Delaware does not have default
statutory advancement.157 Any inquiry into the scope and circumstances
in which advancement is allowed under Delaware law would be an
inquiry into the specific grant in the corporation’s articles of
incorporation, not the wording of the statute. Therefore, the company
chooses the extent of the advancement. Contrarily, a limitation on the
extent of the default advancement is appropriate where the legislature,
not a specific company, places a uniform advancement requirement on
all corporations. The limitation should strike a balance between
preserving the director’s right to advancement and safeguarding against
the unusual circumstances present in Miller.
Bearing in mind that the beneficiary of this statute was intended to be
the corporation is important.158 Neither interpretation of the language by
the parties (“seeking a benefit for the corporation” or “by or in the right
of the corporation”) helped Trumbell in this case. The corporation was
at war with itself. Although Trumbell was named as a plaintiff and was
paying the plaintiff’s legal fees, the Board never voted to be a part of the
suit. The Board had no real independent voice, yet was the only party
being forced to pay. The case was a derivative suit, implying that the
corporation was to be the beneficiary of the ruling, but the unique
circumstances called that presumption into question.159 The court failed
to address who represented Trumbell and what were Trumbell’s
interests. That failure, combined with rendering the limitation language
moot, made the court’s espousal of advancement doctrine contrary to the
purpose and the plain language of the statute.

154. OSBA Brief, supra note 26, at 6.
155. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.13(E)(5)(a) (West 2012) (“Unless at the time of a director’s
act or omission that is the subject of an action, suit, or proceeding referred to in division (E)(1) or (2) of
this section . . . .”).
156. Miller v. Miller, 973 N.E.2d 228, 237 (Ohio 2012).
157. See United States v. Stein, 452 F. Supp. 2d 230, 271 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
158. OSBA Brief, supra note 26, at 2.
159. EISENBERG & COX, supra note 1, at 1047 (“[A]ny relief recovered in a derivative
action . . . is returned to the corporation.”).
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2. The Need for a Meaningful “Cooperation” Standard
In the absence of any language addressing statutory limitations on
advancement, the court could have created a strict standard for
reasonable cooperation by the director.
As the court points out, advancement is not automatic; it arises when
a director has completed an undertaking.160 In the undertaking, the
director agrees to repay the fees if his conduct is deemed to have been
recoverable under section 1701.59 and to reasonably cooperate with the
corporation.161 The court did not set any standard for cooperation. In
fact, the court found the director cooperated, despite evidence that the
director was more than just elusive.162
Given the unintended
consequences of the statute, the court should have balanced the
inequities by strictly construing the terms “reasonably cooperate,” to
place a higher, but appropriate, burden on a director who receives the
benefit of payment.
Trumbell’s status as a close corporation and the family feud within
the board created unique circumstances in Miller that are pertinent here.
The statute required the director to cooperate with the corporation.163
But, as shown above, the corporation had no independent voice in the
litigation.
The majority in Miller dismissed the idea that a director could not
“reasonably cooperate” with its opponent in litigation.164 The dissent
stressed this point and encouraged the General Assembly to take up the
issue.165 Neither examined what level of cooperation would be needed
to meet the statute’s requirement, nor did they use the facts to support
their argument for or against a meaningful standard of cooperation.
The majority stated that no evidence showed that the defendant
“actually failed to cooperate,” suggesting that a mere promise to
reasonably cooperate is enough for advancement.166 Here, the trial court
sanctioned Director Miller after finding that he wrongfully withheld
documents during discovery.167 In a deposition, Director Miller refused
to answer a question, explaining that he would comply only with
requests from a majority of the Trumbell Board, whom Director Miller
felt represented the corporation.168 Furthermore, Director Miller knew
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.13(E)(5) (West 2012).
Id.
See Miller v. Miller, 973 N.E.2d 228, 240 (Ohio 2012).
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.13(E)(5)(a)(ii) (West 2012).
Miller, 973 N.E.2d at 241.
Id. at 243.
Id. at 240–41.
See Shareholders Brief, supra note 44, at 15.
Id. at 18.
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that it would be impossible for a majority, and therefore the plaintiff, to
make a request of him because he and his fellow defendant were the
other two directors.169 Therefore, when he agreed to cooperate, he knew
he would not have to comply with any request from the plaintiff.170 In
that way, Justice O’Donnell was correct to point out in his dissenting
opinion that it was impossible for the defendant and plaintiff to
reasonably cooperate. The dissent solves the problem of what level of
cooperation is necessary by eliminating advancement duties when the
director is a party-opponent to the corporation.171 That seems too farreaching when applied to all circumstances where the corporation is
suing a director. As the dissent states, he agrees with the majority that a
corporation cannot avoid advancement “by making the mere allegation
that the director committed fraud or breached a fiduciary duty.”172 The
statute also clearly anticipated advancing fees when directors are
defendants.173 But the dissent’s argument should apply in special
circumstances, like Miller, in which the parties are too intertwined in a
close corporation for the director to be able to cooperate.
The fact that Director Miller’s promise to cooperate was clearly
illusory should have resulted in a finding that he did not meet the
requirements of the undertaking. According to the majority, however,
Director Miller fulfilled the requirements of the undertaking, and his
statement during discovery was not enough to demonstrate Director
Miller failed to cooperate.
The Court ignored the fact that no majority of the board existed in
this case, and no independent corporation was available to make a
request of Director Miller.174 Instead, the majority read the “reasonably
cooperate” language to mean that the defendant “need not surrender his
right to defend himself” but did not elaborate on how far he may go to
defend himself while cooperating with the party suing him.175
The majority opinion went too far in finding that a director who
withholds documents and states he will only comply with requests he
knows are impossible has met the statutory requirement of cooperation.
The trial court went so far as to award attorneys’ fees to the plaintiff for
the additional expenses incurred due to the defendant’s withholdings.176
By this standard, even if sanctions are imposed for obstruction, a

169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Id.
See id. at 4–5.
Miller, 973 N.E.2d at 243 (O’Donnell, J., dissenting).
Id.
OSBA Brief, supra note 26, at 3.
Shareholders Brief, supra note 44, at 18.
Miller, 973 N.E.2d at 240–41.
Shareholders Brief, supra note 44, at 15.
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defendant would still be cooperating. Delaying disclosure of materials
harmful to the defendant, but required by law to be disclosed, would fail
under the majority’s idea of preserving the right to defend oneself. But
wrongfully withholding documents cannot be considered legally
defending oneself.
Because Miller was the first time the Ohio Supreme Court looked at
the amended statute, no other case law exists addressing the level of
cooperation a director must abide by in order to receive advanced legal
in Ohio.177 However, problems exist with both the majority’s and the
dissent’s views on how to address this issue. Merriam-Webster defines
“cooperate” as: “to act or work with another or others; act together or in
compliance.”178 What did the General Assembly intend when it required
a director to cooperate with the corporation?
Cooperation clauses are common in insurance policies, including
D&O insurance.179 An insurer may require that in order for the insurer
to defend a suit, the insured must cooperate in good faith.180 Actions
that constitute a violation of a cooperation clause include failure to give
notice of [a possible claim], failure to forward paperwork timely, and
failure to give honest and complete answers.181 These actions hinder the
insurer from preparing an adequate defense.182
The insurance setting is distinct from this one because, in the context
of insurance, it is always in the best interest of both the insured and
insurer to cooperate in order to mount a successful defense.
Nonetheless, it provides an informative standard for cooperation.
Director Miller would have failed under the insurance test by failing to
produce documents and refusing to answer questions.
Director Miller also failed to cooperate because his agreement to
cooperate was made in bad faith.183 Director Miller knew he would

177. Miller, 973 N.E.2d at 233.
178. Cooperate,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM,
http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/cooperate (last visited Aug. 27, 2013).
179. RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 49:106 (4th ed. 2012), available at
Westlaw 16 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 49:106. See also JOSEPH WARREN BISHOP II ET AL., LAW OF
CORPORATE OFFICERS & DIRECTORS § 8:34 (2012), available at Westlaw LAW OF CORP. OFFICERS &
DIR. § 8:34 (“D&O policies may contain a cooperation clause providing that the insurer’s consent to
settlements shall not be unreasonably withheld. Rather, the insurer shall be entitled to full information
and all particulars it may request in order to reach a decision as to the reasonableness of the settlement.
These clauses often provide that the corporation may not take any action that increases the exposure of
the insurer. The purpose of these clauses is to prevent collusion between the insured and allegedly
injured party during a settlement.”) (citations omitted).
180. LORD, supra note 179, § 49:107.
181. Id.
182. Id. § 49:106.
183. MARY THERESE K. FITZGERALD ET AL., OHIO JURISPRUDENCE § 473 (3d ed. 2012), available
at Westlaw 12 Ohio Jur. 3d § 473.
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never have to cooperate because a majority of the Board, and therefore
the corporation, would never be able to make a request. Although the
standard for cooperation is unclear from the statute, the General
Assembly made it a requirement and would not have done so if it could
be complied with as easily as the court found.
D. What Happens Next
After the Miller decision, many questions exist about how to deal
with advancement, most of which are beyond the scope of this article.
This section will briefly address three areas of concern after Miller: (1)
corporations opting out of advancement entirely; (2) corporations being
forced to pay legal fees in a suit where their interests are not adequately
protected; and (3) directors taking advantage of a lenient cooperation
standard.
1. Corporations Opting Out
The easiest solution to the issues raised in Miller is that corporations
should opt out of advancement, making it a non-issue. However,
because the right to advancement is a key consideration for potential
directors, the lack of this right could dissuade quality candidates from
choosing to become directors.184 Furthermore, the ability to purchase
D&O insurance makes having to pay out attorneys’ fees less of a
financial issue for corporations.185 Opting out completely would also be
harmful to the corporation. If a director was the subject of an action
where he was trying to get judgment on behalf of the corporation,
advancing legal fees would be in the corporation’s best interest. The
corporation could advance fees, even if it opted-out entirely, but a
director who had to seek permission of the board may be dissuaded from
the claim altogether. Furthermore, if everyone opted out of the
advancement provision, the statute would be rendered moot and the
protections afforded by it meaningless. The General Assembly adopted
the statute to make Ohio friendlier to corporations, and default
advancement is an important tool to accomplish that goal.186
2. Inadequate Protection of the Corporation’s Interest
Second, in cases like Miller in which the corporation’s interests are
illusory and the Board is at war, the advancement statute will no longer
184. OSBA Brief, supra note 26, at 2.
185. EISENBERG & COX, supra note 1, at 690.
186. OSBA Brief, supra note 26, at 2.
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serve to protect quality directors and corporations. Instead, both sides
will loot the corporate treasury because no one can adequately protect
the corporation’s interest. Under Ohio law, corporations are distinct
from both their shareholders and their directors.187 Both groups,
however, are expected to represent and preserve the interests of the
corporation. A majority of the board is deemed to represent the
corporation, and shareholders can bring a complaint on behalf of an
injured corporation through derivative suits.188 As the court held,
advancement contemplates four situations in which a director has a right
to advancement: (1) when the corporation, by a vote of the majority of
the board, sues a director; (2) when the corporation, in a derivative
action brought by shareholders, sues a director; (3) when the corporation
or director is sued by a third party; and (4) when the director sues a third
party on behalf of the corporation. In Miller, whose facts did not fall
neatly into any of these categories, the court made a generally applicable
legal pronouncement, thereby ignoring the corporation’s interest. After
Miller, courts no longer need to look at the corporation’s role in the suit.
Instead, regardless of form and procedure, directors can use the
corporation’s treasury to fund their offensive and defensive actions
under the guise of benefit to the corporation. This will have a larger
effect on closely held corporations, like Trumbell, which have few board
members, are family run, and whose sole shareholders are also directors.
Because advancement becomes mandatory with a simple execution of
meaningless promises, corporate funds can be pilfered to fund family
feuds and Board arguments without any regard to fiduciary obligations
or safeguards for the corporate interest.
3. Worthless Cooperation
The third problem presented by Miller is that no standard for
cooperation was set and directors could easily take advantage of this and
in fact are encouraged to because they are not paying the legal fees.
Defendant-corporations have an incentive to draw out a case in hopes of
the plaintiff abandoning the case due to lack of money or effort. A
plaintiff-director who has unlimited advanced fees would have the same
incentive as the defendant-corporation to draw out litigation. After
Miller, a corporation must always advance legal fees to a director when
it receives an undertaking, including a promise to cooperate given in bad
faith. A director should not be able to withhold documents for months
and refuse to answer requests from members of the board and still
187. EISENBERG & COX, supra note 1, at 191 (“A corporation is a legal person or legal entity.”);
see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.13 (West 2012).
188. OSBA Brief, supra note 26, at 2.
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receive his legal fees. If that were the case, why would a director not be
“difficult”? The corporation is essentially battling itself, but the
defendant has no incentive to bring a quick close to the case. In fact, the
longer the director can withhold documents and weasel out of questions,
the more the corporation will have to pay for the director’s legal fees.
The court established no standard for cooperation and allowed a director
acting in bad faith, much less a merely “difficult” director, to receive
advancement, creating an incentive for the director to be disagreeable.
Furthermore, in cases like Miller where the director knows a majority
vote is impossible, the director has no duty to cooperate at all. That runs
contrary to the purpose of advancement and the general interest of
corporations, as well as the statutory requirement of ORC
1701.13(E)(5)(a).
IV. CONCLUSION
In Miller, the Ohio Supreme Court reviewed the 1986 Ohio amended
advancement statute. It held that advancement of legal fees to directors
is mandatory unless a corporation specifically opts out of the provision,
or the corporation can show the director has not met the requirements of
the undertaking. The court generally interpreted the advancement
statute correctly, but it left many questions unanswered, rendering the
future of the advancement right unclear.
The General Assembly should reexamine this statute in light of the
issues in Miller to determine how best to accomplish its goal of
attracting and retaining corporations. It should amend the statute to
include specific situations when advancement applies, instead of
referring to another part of the statute, to make the advancement right
clear.
After Miller, corporations and transactional attorneys should pay
close attention to the duties the corporations are undertaking when
incorporating in Ohio and protect the corporation against situations like
Miller, where the only losing party was the corporation.
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